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Abstract
Legitimacy of international investment law is in crisis. One particular area of international 
investment law that has been progressively re-developed is the area of investment dispute 
settlement. The EU sees the multilateral investment court as a proper solution to reform ISDS 
in the future.  To achieve this final goal, starting from the bilateral level, the EU has included 
investment court provisions as an ISDS mechanism in its latest trade and investment agreement 
with its trading partners, among others, EU-Viet Nam FTA and IPA, as well as EU-Singapore 
FTA & IPA. This paper addresses central questions on how could existing investment court 
system in EU and ASEAN member states’ Investment Protection Agreements (IPA) can be 
expanded towards multilateral investment court in the future, and what are the challenges that 
can be expected from such expansion. It critically analyses concluded agreements between the 
EU and some of ASEAN Member States. I argue that for now, it is unlikely that multilateral 
investment court expansion will happen soon considering the challenges and concerns expressed 
by both sides.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legitimacy of international investment law is in crisis. One particular 
area of international investment law that has been progressively re-
developed is the area of investment dispute settlement. Backlashes 
and criticism of existing traditional investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) from the society driven the demand to reform of the system. 
Critics attack the ISDS system based on several arguments, among 
others, arbitrator impartiality and ethical issues, divergent decision 
based over the similar factual circumstances, irreversible erroneous 
decision, nationality shopping by the investor, high costs proceeding, 
lack of transparency and so forth.1 Several incremental steps to reform 
have been taken to reform the system, including the enhancement of 
1  UNCTAD, Improving Investment Dispute Settlement: UNCTAD Policy Tools, IIA 
Issue Note, issue no. 4, November 2017, 8.
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transparency in ISDS through UNCITRAL’s initiative of Mauritius 
Convention,2 as well as undergoing amendment efforts of ICSID rules 
and regulation.3 But more radical change is coming to replace the 
entire system through the establishment permanent institution so-called 
multilateral investment court, proposed by the European Union (EU).4
The EU sees the multilateral investment court as a proper solution 
to reform ISDS in the future.5 To achieve this goal, EU has started from 
the bilateral level with EU’s trading partners, through the inclusion of 
investment court provisions as the prevailing ISDS mechanism in its 
latest trade and investment agreement. The first agreement to include 
such provisions is the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA),6 and the second being EU-Viet Nam Free Trade 
and Investment Protection Agreement.7 Just recently, the EU also signed 
the FTA-IPA with Singapore in October 2018,8 which also contain the 
investment court system (ICS) provisions. In addition, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP) which is still under negotiation 
with the US will likely to feature ICS.9 Albeit the differences in some 
parts of the provisions, investment disputes procedure across the EU-
negotiated treaties has the common elements as proposed by the EU, 
2  Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (adopted 10 
December 2004) UNTS 54749 (Mauritius Convention)
3  ICSID, ‘ICSID Rules and Regulations Amendment Process,’ <https://icsid.world-
bank.org/en/amendments>  accessed 8 March 2019.
4  European Union, ‘Submission of the European Union and its Member States to UN-
CITRAL Working Group III,’ (18 January 2019) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf> accessed 12 March 2019.
5  Cecilia Malmström, ‘A Multilateral Investment Court: a contribution to the 
conversation about reform of investment dispute 
settlement’ (European Commission, 22 November 2018), < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2018/november/tradoc_157512.pdf> accessed 8 March 2019. 
6  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the 
one part, and the European Union and Its Member States
7  The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part con-
cluded December 2015, entry into force 2018
8  The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States of the one part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the other part
9  European Commission, ‘The Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership: Mak-
ing Trade Work for You,’ <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/> accessed 8 
March 2019
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namely, presence of standing tribunal member, the division proceeding 
between first instance and appeal tribunal, inception of ethical rules 
for arbitration, disclosure of finding, and so forth.10 Thus, through the 
recent efforts by the EU, we can see that investment court system is 
already in its test drive phase, marking the radical reform of ISDS that 
is taking place gradually.  
A regional organisation such as ASEAN could be the stepping-stone 
towards the establishment of multilateral investment court. Other than 
Singapore and Viet Nam, some of ASEAN member states are still in 
negotiation with the EU with regard to trade and investment agreement.11 
In the recent EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, both organisations 
expressed the adherence to multilateralism and commitment for creation 
of EU-ASEAN FTA in future.12 Therefore, it is interesting to see the 
development of investment court from inter-regional cooperation 
perspective. This paper addresses central questions on how could existing 
investment court system in EU and ASEAN member states’ Investment 
Protection Agreements (IPA) can be expanded towards multilateral 
investment court in the future, and what are the challenges that can 
be expected from such expansion. It critically analyses concluded 
agreements between the EU and the ASEAN Member States, among 
others, EU-Viet Nam and EU-Singapore IPA, and agreements which 
are still undergoing negotiation such as Indonesia-EU Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (IEU-CEPA).
EU approach of ISDS reform indeed has been commented many 
10  Kyle Dylan Dickson-Smith, ‘Does the European Union Have New Clothes?: Un-
derstanding the EU’s New Investment Treaty Mode’ (2016) 773 Journal of World 
Investment & Trade 17, 774
11  Among others, Indonesia (ongoing), Philippines (ongoing, Myanmar (ongoing), 
Malaysia (ongoing), Thailand (postponed). See European Commission, ‘Overview 
of FTA and other Trade Negotiations,’ <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/
december/tradoc_118238.pdf> accessed 8 March 2019.
12  European Union External Action, ‘Joint statement of the 22nd EU-ASEAN min-
isterial meeting’ (European Union External Action, 22 January 2019) <https://eeas.
europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/56912/joint-statement-22nd-eu-ase-
an-ministerial-meeting_en> accessed 8 March 2019.
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times in the scholarship recently.13 However, the discussion on the 
prospect to expand ICS into a multialteral investment court is not a 
recurring discussion, particularly from the perspective of Asian 
countries. Therefore, this paper serves to fill the gap in the literature. 
This paper will be divided as follows, in the first part it will address 
the EU’s reform initiatives. While in the second part, it mainly 
discusses the investment court system from the ASEAN (Member 
States) perspective. In the concluding part, I will deliver the conclusion 
that multilateral investment court is a promising proposal to tackle 
the concerns over ISDS and replace the ISDS mechanism. However, 
challenges are coming from either side of EU and ASEAN in terms of 
multiplication of ICS in the future investment protection agreement. 
Plus, the inconsistency of EU practice with Japan may discourage 
further participation of ASEAN Member States in participating in EU’s 
project in establishing multilateral investment court in the future. Thus, 
it is unlikely that multilateral investment court expansion will happen 
soon considering these challenges. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTMENT COURT SYSTEM
As briefly mentioned above, the Investment Court System is a 
reform proposed by the EU. The rationale for reform was driven by the 
backlashes and criticism from the society against the prevailing ISDS 
mechanism to solve the foreign investment disputes. This part elaborates 
those criticisms and arguments against current ISDS mechanism 
employed by various IIA, and how the EU proposal to reform ISDS 
by creating ‘investment court system’ become a realisation through the 
bilateral agreements. 
A. CRITICISM OF EXISTING ISDS
About half of century ago, the ISDS mechanism was created to 
overcome the shortcomings of available avenue for an investor to 
protect its investment in the developing countries from the interference 
of the host state. Inter-state dispute settlement through enabled by 
13  See Dickson-Smith, note 10; Umair Ghori, ‘The International Investment Court 
System: The Way Forward for Asia,’ (2018) 205 International Trade & Business Law 
Review 21, 209.
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diplomatic protection of investor’s government involves a lot of chains 
of bureaucracy and consumes time. But on the other hand, resolution 
of the dispute through the host state’s domestic court did not promise 
a fair and impartial process, as alleged by investors. Consequently, 
dispute settlement mechanism that allows the investor to directly raise 
a claim against the host state government through arbitration channel 
was considered an innovative solution at that time. However, time 
and circumstances changed and the ISDS mechanism considered not 
suitable anymore.
Through the course of its existence, we have seen ISDS mechanism 
judged the state’s macroeconomic policy during the crisis with 
inconsistent decisions,14 proceedings that took years to resolve15 and 
costs millions of dollars for both parties. These controversial cases were 
mainly ‘judged’ by relatively small pool of arbitrator, which due to 
their lack of diversity being called “pale, male, and stale” club.16 Some 
arbitrators’ lack of public interest lenses contributed to the decision 
that often undermined and overlooked the right to regulate of the host 
country.17 Rules of international investment law that scattered across 
the international investment agreements (IIAs) without any precedent 
rules binding the arbitrator also created open norm interpretation that 
often went far-fetched and created uncertainty. Even some of the 
interpretations of IIA provisions went against the initial intention of 
concluding States. These criticisms and shortcomings pushed the call 
for reform of existing ISDS mechanism. 
Several states adopted different attitudes and policy options with 
regard to ISDS that bound upon them. First policy option is to terminate 
the IIAs and withdraw from agreements that enabled ISDS proceeding. 
14  This refers to series of ISDS litigation faced by Argentina
15  Victor Pey Casado case took 17 years to resolve. See Victor Pey Casado and Presi-
dent Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2.
16  Adrian Lai, ‘ISDS Reform Conference: Mapping the Way Forward Discussion Pa-
per for the Session on Appointment of Arbitrators and Related Issues’ (ISDS Reform 
Conference – Mapping the Way Forward, Hong Kong, 13 February 2019), 18
17  Stephan W. Schill, ‘Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Conceptual 
Framework and Options for the Way Forward’ E15 Task Force on Investment Policy 
Think Piece, July 2015, 2
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Indonesia terminated BITs with its partners in 2014,18 the reason is 
most likely to limit the exposure to ISDS claim. Even more extreme 
policy was taken by Venezuela by withdrawing from ICSID in 2012.19 
Some other states working towards the ISDS reform that pushes for 
strengthened institutionalisation, including by introducing appeal 
mechanism to create check and recheck mechanism for ISDS ruling. 
The EU and the US had indicated the adherence to introduce appeal 
mechanism modeled after the success of WTO Appellate Body.20 The 
appeal mechanism is crucial to ensure coherence and predictability 
of international investment law. Further, the reform of ISDS can also 
be enabled by increasing transparency by allowing participation of 
non-disputing parties’ amicus curiae. A major initiative to reform the 
transparency is the introduction of Mauritius Convention that provides 
an opt-in procedure for UNCITRAL Rules for Transparency. Arbitrator’s 
ethics and accountability also proposed to be enhanced the introduction 
of a strong code of conduct and ethical rules. The discussion of reform is 
underway at the international level through UNCTAD and UNCITRAL 
(Working Group III) as the platforms of stakeholders’ discussion on the 
matter of ISDS reform.21
B. EU PROPOSAL OF ISDS REFORM
Lisbon Treaty mandated EU matter of foreign direct investment 
to be under a broadened Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the 
Union.22 Since then, the EU has been progressively negotiating trade 
and investment agreement with its trading partners, proposing the 
EU’s own approach on an investment agreement on behalf of EU 
Member States.23 EU Member States are not involved in negotiations 
18  Anthony Crockett, ‘The Termination of Indonesia’s BITs: Changing the Bathwater, 
but Keeping the Baby?’ (2017) 836 The Journal of Investment and Trade 18, 837.
19  IISD, ‘Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve’ 
(IISD, 13 April 2012) <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-
from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/> accessed 8 March 2019.
20  Schill, (n. 16), 8.
21  UNCTAD (n. 1). 
22 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 of 17 December 2007.
23  August Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path, Quo Vadis Europe: The Future 
of EU BITs and Other Investment Agreements’ (2013) 111 Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law12, 124.
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of IIAs, instead it is the Commission in Brussels that conclude the 
IIAs. However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued Opinion 
2/15 which determined that investment protection and ISDS section 
of EU-Singapore FTA are outside of EU CCP competence.24 Meaning 
that agreements which contain the ISDS provision is not an exclusive 
competition of EU, but rather, it must be negotiated and agreed along 
with EU member states as a “mixed agreement”. This sets the precedent 
for the following EU’s trade and investment agreement negotiation 
practice with its partners.25 In the negotiation with its trading partners, 
EU always promotes ‘the gold standard’ for investment protection 
that goes beyond lowest common denominator, but at the same time, 
the EU attempt to preserves the right to regulate of the State.26 Public 
consultation held in 2014 during the TTIP negotiation yields to more 
than 150,000 replies from the public, which particularly addressed the 
concerns over the need to introduce tribunal of the second instance to 
promote correctness in ISDS decision, thus this fuelled the Commission 
to conclude ‘reformed’ IIAs in the future.27
The push for better ISDS also called by the European Parliament. In 
July, it adopted a resolution urging the Commission to replace existing 
ISDS mechanism with a new better mechanism which is transparent, 
independent judges-ruled, and contain a limitation of private interests 
so that they could not defeat the public policy objectives. 28 Within 
the same year, the EU published a concept paper titled “Investment in 
TTIP and beyond – the path for reform.”29 In this paper it was revealed 
that the new investment and trade agreements with partner countries, 
Canada and Singapore, will feature the new approach aimed for ISDS 
reform. Key points of the initiatives directly addressed the criticism 
24  ECJ, Opinion 2/15 of the Court, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376
25  Marise Cremona, ‘Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 
2017’ (2018) 231 European Constituional Law Review 14, 233.
26  Reinisch, (n. 22) 124.
27  Catherine Titi, ‘The European Union’s Proposal for an International Investment 
Court: Significance, Innovations and Challenges Ahead,’ (2016) Transnational Dis-
pute Management 1 
28  Ibid., 3.
29  European Commission, ‘Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path 
for reform’ <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF> 
accessed 12 March 2019
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and shortcomings of existing ISDS framework. Proposed mechanism 
excludes the possibility of forum shopping by imposes strict ‘real business 
operation’ condition requirement to establish the jurisdiction of dispute 
settlement; strict government-controlled rule interpretation reference; 
ethics rules and code of conduct for arbitrator; early dismissals and 
fast track system that disallows frivolous claims; introduction of “loser 
pays principle”; introduction of appeal mechanism; and prohibition of 
parallel proceedings.30
Presently, the texts of the agreement are already apparent, it has 
indeed laid down the EU’s vision of ISDS reform. The new agreements 
which include the EU’s proposal are among others, EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), EU-Singapore 
FTA-IPA, EU-Viet Nam FTA-IPA. However, with regard to its 
investment and investment dispute part, no case has been submitted 
under the new mechanism.
II. BUILDING MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT: 
ASEAN PERSPECTIVE
Relationship of the EU and ASEAN as regional organisations 
has always been a strategic one. In 2016, Commission sought the 
authorisation from the Council to negotiate the free trade agreement 
with ASEAN, and the authorisation was issued on the condition where 
it could not reach the agreement with ASEAN, the negotiation would 
proceed with each of ASEAN Member States bilaterally. 31 Recently, the 
EU and ASEAN expressed its commitment to continue the negotiation 
of EU-ASEAN FTA which aims for expansion of inter-regional trade, 
business, and investment.32 As we recall, the EU has concluded the 
negotiation of FTA-IPA with Singapore and Viet Nam, therefore further 
expansion of trade and investment agreement would be foreseeable. 
However, whether it will feature ICS as a substitute for existing ISDS 
mechanism, is till questionable. This section attempts to assess the ICS 
30  Ibid., 2-3.
31  ECJ, (n. 23)
32  European Union External Action, ‘ASEAN-EU Action Plan 2018-2022’ <https://
eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/56912/joint-statement-22nd-
eu-asean-ministerial-meeting_en> accessed 8 March 2019.
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proposal and multilateral investment court from the lens of ASEAN and 
its Member States.
A. ASEAN EXPERIENCE OF ISDS AND CALL FOR 
REFORM
ASEAN consisted of a pool of developing and less-developed 
countries. The Member States regard foreign direct investment as a 
key component to boost the development nationally and regionally.33 
Thus, a domestic and regional regulation policy that modeled to attract 
investment still prevails in the region. It is important to note that even 
though ASEAN has the competence to conclude an investment treaty,34 
the agreement does not have direct effect, unlike EU-concluded treaties 
that directly enforceable to Member States. Despite the ASEAN’s 
power to engage in external relations, each of ASEAN Member States 
also has and still actively engaged in the conclusion of IIAs with each 
own trading partners. Malaysia has the most IIAs at hand with 91 IIAs, 
second and third being Singapore and Viet Nam respetively.35 In terms 
of investment dispute settlement, with the exception of Singapore, 
Cambodia, and Brunei, all ASEAN Member States have faced investors’ 
lawsuit through ISDS mechanism as a respondent state. 
Indonesia in 2014 reviewed and terminated IIAs that are concluded 
between 1960s and 1990s.36 This move is high likely to minimise 
the risk of exposure from ISDS. Even stronger call for Indonesia to 
withdraw from ICSID also expressed by a commentator.37 Even 
though strong opposition of ISDS remains, let alone withdrawing 
from ICSID, Indonesia is still continuing to conclude IIAs with ISDS 
33  ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat), 
p. 44.
34  ASEAN Charter, Art. 41.7. “ASEAN may conclude agreements with countries or 
sub-regional, regional and international organisations and institutions.”
35  UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Hub’ <https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org> ac-
cessed 8 March 2019
36  David Price, ‘Indonesia’s Bold Strategy on Bilateral Investment Treaties: Seeking 
an Equitable Climate for Investment?’ (2017) 124 Asian Journal of International Law 
7, 124.
37  Hikmahanto Juwana, ‘Indonesia Should Withdraw from the ICSID!’ (Jakarta Post, 
2 April 2014) <www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/02/indonesia-should-with-
draw-icsid.html> accessed 14 March 2019.
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provision within it,38 but in a more careful manner.39 Inclusion of ISDS 
provisions justified by the need to attract foreign investment according 
to Indonesia’s policy approach.40 Similar tone also observable with 
Malaysian practice. Despite Malaysia’s experience with ISDS, it chooses 
not to abandon the ISDS system entirely but taking a more cautious 
and careful approach in drafting future IIAs. Malaysia seek future IIAs 
which could better in balancing the State’s right to regulate of and the 
interests of investor.41 While Thailand in UNICTRAL Working Group 
III submitted its position with regard to ISDS reform. It addressed the 
issue of ethical concern of arbitrator, third-party funding, incoherent 
treaty interpretation and calls for capacity building and legal assistance 
for developing countries as can be found in WTO dispute settlement 
through Advisory Centre for WTO Law (ACWL).42 
Preference to ISDS mechanism is still apparent in the ASEAN’s 
investment treaty. In the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement43 for 
instance, ISDS provision still exists although crafted cautiously and 
modernised. It features incremental enhancement such as expertise 
requirement for the third arbitrator, limited transparency rule.44 In 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), it still has 
the ISDS provision. The disputes under ACIA are not exclusively 
only can be submitted to arbitration institutions such as ICSID or ad 
hoc under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, or Kuala Lumpur’s Regional 
Centre for Arbitration, but also the provision acknowledge the recourse 
to a domestic administrative tribunal.45 The agreement also attempted 
to create transparency rules for parties to publish awards and decision 
38  J. J. Losari & M. Ewing-Chow, ‘Regional Considerations - Reflective or Reac-
tionary? Indonesia’s Approaches to International Investment Agreements and Recom-
mendations for the Future,’ (2015) Transnational Dispute Management 12.
39  Crockett, (n. 17), 844.
40  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.156
41  Sufian Jusoh, Muhammad Faliq Abd Razak, Mohamad Azim Mazlan, ‘Malaysia 
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Learning From Experience’ (2017) 890 Jour-
nal of World Investment and Trade 18, 916.
42  UNCITRAL, ‘Possible reform of Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) Com-
ments by the Government of Thailand A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.147 
43  The Agreement on Investment Under The Framework Agreement on Comprehen-
sive Economic Cooperation (ASEAN-India)
44  Ibid., Art. 20.16 & 20.17.
45  ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Art. 33
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publicly, but with a weak “may” clause.46 Other than that, the two 
agreements contain typical provisions of ISDS without significant 
difference but tailored in a more detailed way. Despite the concern and 
experience of some ASEAN Member States over the past practice of 
ISDS, there is no significant breakthrough to introduce reform of ISDS, 
at least in intra-ASEAN level. This situation is more or less can be 
regarded as preference to status quo of existing ISDS rules. Therefore, 
the invitation of ISDS reform by EU through the inclusion of ICS 
mechanism under the investment agreement can be seen as a positive 
sign for ASEAN to reform the ISDS in the future.
B. ICS IN EU-VIET NAM AND EU-SINGAPORE IPA
With the conclusion of EU-Viet Nam and EU-Singapore IPA, for 
EU, the ICS and ISDS reform is not a theoretical debate anymore. 
Despite negotiated in a bilateral manner by each party, dispute 
settlement sections of both IPAs have similarity and followed a 
common structure. However, there are slight differences in the wording 
of the ISDS provisions, for instance, EU-Viet Nam IPA clearly excludes 
the application of Most Favoured Nations (MFN) rule to dispute 
settlement, while for EU-Singapore IPA, it does not feature MFN clause 
at all. Consequently, the ICS provisions on both agreements cannot be 
applied cross-ASEAN member states.47 Regarding the scope of dispute 
settlement, EU-Viet Nam IPA put a stricter measure to exclude fraudulent 
investment from accessing the dispute settlement, but in contrast, a 
similar clause is absent in EU-Singapore IPA.48 Both agreements adhere 
to amicable dispute resolution, which enables the parties to settle the 
dispute through agreement at any time of the dispute.49 The time frame 
of dispute also slightly different in both agreements. Both parties can 
enter the consultation, in case of EU-Singapore IPA, within 30 months 
starting since treatment breaching the obligation under the agreement 
46  Ibid., Art. 39
47  The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Mem-
ber States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (EU-Viet Nam IPA) 
Art. 2.4.5
48  Ibid., Art. 3.27.2
49  The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Mem-
ber States of the one part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the other part (EU-Singa-
pore IPA)Art. 3.2; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.29.
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was known, or 10 years if local remedies were pursued. In the case of 
EU-Viet Nam IPA, it should be within 3 years from the first breach, and 
if local remedies pursued no later than 7 years.50
If no solution found in the consultation phase, the claimant can 
bring the case to the tribunal of the first instance. The disputing parties 
may choose arbitration rules either from ICSID Convention, ICSID 
Additional Facilities Rules, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or any other 
arbitral rules.51 Different from traditional arbitration procedure, the 
disputing party bring the case to a standing tribunal which composes 
from nationals of both parties of IPA, and third state nationals. However, 
there are differences in terms of the size of Tribunal in each IPA. In 
EU-Singapore, there are six persons of standing tribunal in total, where 
two of them from EU Member States, two from Singapore, while two 
others are from the third country, serving for eight years term. In EU-
Viet Nam IPA, there are nine Tribunal members in total, with each party 
appoint three persons serving for four years term.52 Because of the this 
standing ‘court’-like nature, each of the members of Tribunal is entitled 
to monthly retainer fee from each party, and the fee is administered by 
ICSID Secretariat.53 However, the amount of retainer fee is unknown 
from the text of the agreement. While for appeal Tribunal, both 
agreements set six members with similar composition, but 8 years 
terms for EU-Singapore IPA and four years for EU-Viet Nam IPA.54 
Members of both Tribunals chosen by its qualification standard, must 
be independent beyond doubt, and bound to ethics rule and comply with 
the code of conduct.55
Disputing party can bring the ruling into appeal procedure within 
90 days. The grounds of appeal are among others, manifest error in 
interpretation or application of the law, and application of facts. In 
addition to these grounds, annulment conditions set by Art. 52 ICSID 
Convention is applicable mutatis mutandis.56 The appeal tribunal has 
50  EU-Singapore IPA, Art, 3.3.3; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.30.
51  EU-Singapore IPA, Art. 39; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.33.2.
52  EU-Singapore IPA, Art, 3.9; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.38.2 & 3.38.5.
53  EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.9; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.38.14.
54  EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.10; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.39.
55  EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.11; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.40
56  EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.19; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.54.
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the power to modify even reverse the previous ruling.57 To discourage 
frivolous claim, both ICS applies the principle of losing party pays.58 
Other than disputing party, the third parties can be involved in the 
proceeding as the non-disputing parties through amicus curiae 
submission mechanism.59 In terms of procedure, the most significant 
difference from both IPAs is the fact that EU-Viet Nam IPA has an anti-
circumvention mechanism that gives the power to Tribunal to reject 
jurisdiction if forum shopping practice is prima facie foreseeable.60
Although similar, there are differences in the details ICS procedure 
between the two agreements. But ICS procedure in both IPAs drew a 
rough illustration of what multilateral investment court would like in the 
future. The drafters of both agreements also included a unique clause to 
future-proof the agreement, preparing towards the creation of multilateral 
investment court.61 In EU-Singapore IPA, it is even more clearly stated 
that both parties intend to pursue the creation of multilateral investment 
court. The provision within EU-Singapore IPA stated the obligation to 
actively “pursue with each other and other interested trading partners, 
the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal.” In this sense, 
the two agreements could serve as the building blocks in establishing a 
multilateral investment court in the future.
IV. IT’S TIME TO JOIN FORCES WITH EU?
Bilateral negotiations of IPAs have become the laboratory for EU 
to experimenting with its ISDS reform proposal. Up until now, the 
implementation of ICS is still pending and there are no cases that brought 
under the newly established mechanism. Thus, to this point empirical 
experience of dispute settlement through ICS is practically absent. 
Some commentators have argued theoretically that ICS would likely 
to be incompatible with ICSID Convention, as ISDS reform through 
57  EU-Singapore IPA,3.19; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.54.
58  EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.21; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.53.4.
59  EU-Singapore IPA,Art. 3.16 & 3.17; EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.51.
60  EU-Viet Nam IPA Art. 3.43. VN
61  EU-Singapore IPA, 3.12; EU-Viet Nam IPA 3.40.
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the establishment of ICS is criticised too fundamental and radical.62 
However, on the other hand, at least the EU did not end up with status 
quo favoring existing ISDS mechanism which has been proven to be 
more problematic. The EU also has actively pushed towards the reform 
involving other like-minded partner, even a commentator argued the 
possibility that the ICS will become ‘the next inevitable paradigm’ in 
foreign investment dispute settlement. 63 
The success of making multilateral investment court obviously 
dependant on the reaction of other EU’s partners. The EU as a global 
economic bloc has the political influence towards its partners to support 
its agenda. In order to achieve the multilateral investment court, inter-
regional bloc cooperation should also be taken into account by EU. In 
this case, involving ASEAN as an EU’s strategic economic partners 
may help to agenda to build the EU’s dream. As mentioned earlier, the 
intention to create EU-ASEAN FTA inter-regional is expressed clearly 
by EU, following the recent EU approach to newer trade and investment 
agreement, it is highly likely that future EU-ASEAN FTA/IPA to include 
ICS mechanism. EU-Singapore and EU-Viet Nam IPAs were just the 
starting point of the expansion. Multilateral investment court clauses 
found in EU-Viet Nam and EU-Singapore IPAs likely to function to 
enable ASEAN’s participation towards multilateral investment court. 
This inter-regional approach in the future would ease up the negotiation 
towards multilateral investment court at the global stage.
However, it is important to keep reminding that up until now there 
is no empirical success of EU’s ICS because it is still in dormant stage 
and practically ineffective. Despite the success in negotiating ICS 
mechanism as a replacement of ordinary ISDS provision in recent 
IPAs, EU Commission itself still struggling to convince EU Member 
States about the viability of ICS mechanism. In recent case, CETA was 
put on provisional entry into force excluding the investment part, this 
is due to Belgium’s request for an opinion to ECJ with regard to ICS 
62  N. Jansen Calamita, ‘The Challenge of Establishing a Multilateral Investment Tri-
bunal at ICSID,’ (2017) 611 ICSID Review 32, 612.
63  Ghori, (n. 13), 209.
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compatibility with EU law.64 Consequently, Belgium’s move delayed 
the ratification process of CETA in general. Until whole ratification 
process is completed ICS is a practically dormant paper tiger. This lack 
of empirical proof and EU’s internal disagreement likely to motivate 
other states to wait and see to decide whether to support and join forces 
with the ISDS reformist through ICS. 
Recent EU’s agreement concluded Japan65 in fact does not feature 
any ICS provision or any investment protection provisions at all. 
Investment matter under this agreement is a small part of a chapter 
titled “Trade in services, investment liberalisation and electronic 
commerce.”66 Thus, this approach can be seen as the inconsistency of 
EU’s practice to promote ICS as the new mechanism to replace ISDS. 
It is questionable why EU was able to push the conclusion of ICS with 
Canada under CETA and pushes the US in TTIP negotiation with regard 
to ICS mechanism, but entirely excluded Japan. Considering these 
countries are also like-minded developed state, this inconsistency is such 
an anomaly of EU practice. Thus, exclusion of ICS with Japan would 
possible discourage some of ASEAN Member States’ engagement with 
EU in terms of establishment ICS under respective IPAs, even would 
create doubt about the formation multilateral investment court in the 
long run. 
In addition, some of the technical details of ICS also problematic 
from the view of developing countries and LDCs. Such as, regarding 
administration costs, to retain the members of Tribunal, each party 
shall make a monthly expenditure to cover the retainer fee.  It is not 
known how exactly the amount in EU-Singapore and EU-Viet Nam 
IPA, but elsewhere in TTIP, it was estimated 2000 Euro per individual 
per month.67 This administrative cost would push prospect states to 
conduct extensive cost and benefit calculation in incorporating ICS 
64  IISD, ‘Belgium requests CJEU for an opinion on the compatibility of ICS in CETA 
with EU law’ (IISD, 21 December 2017), <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/12/21/
belgium-requests-cjeu-for-an-opinion-on-the-compatibility-of-ics-in-ceta-with-eu-
law/> accessed 13 March 2019.
65  EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, 17 July 2018.
66  Ibid., Chapter 8.
67  Ghori, (n. 13) 211.
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mechanism or joining multilateral investment court in the future. 68 One 
huge constraint by developing the country and LDCs in facing ISDS, as 
expressed by Thailand in UNICTRAL Working Group III is regarding 
the capacity and financial constraint to face the ISDS litigation.69 Due 
to the novelty of the working procedure, developing country and LDCs 
might also facing difficulties in using ICS mechanism, thus training and 
capacity building needs to be addressed.70 So far only two out of ten 
ASEAN Member States have concluded a bilateral agreement with the 
EU, these two are indeed exceptional minority. Currently, Indonesia is 
still in the negotiation process of its own agreement with the EU, yet 
reception towards ICS proposal remains inconclusive.71 Thus, from this 
point we can observe that it would be difficult for the EU to achieve 
uniform establishment of ICS throughout ASEAN, and consequently 
the multilateral investment court.
V. CONCLUSION
Long established ISDS mechanism has been the subject of criticism 
being impartial, lack of legitimacy, costly and lengthy procedure, small 
pool of arbitrator, and inconsistent interpretation of rules. Yet, the 
reform of ISDS was rather slow and gradual. The EU, after gaining 
constitutional power to participate in the negotiation of international 
investment agreement, pursued more ambitious trade and investment 
cooperation with its partners. In its proposal with trading partners, the 
EU took public inputs and criticism of traditional ISDS mechanism 
into account. Based on the public input, EU then introduce a novel 
mechanism labeled as ‘investment court system.’ It features strict rules 
on standing tribunal members’ qualification and ethical standard, two-
tier proceeding to correct the erroneous decision and increase coherence, 
68  Catherine Li, “The EU’s Proposal Regarding the Establishment of the Investment 
Court System and the Response from Asia,” (2018) 943 Journal of World Trade 52, 
965.
69  UNCITRAL, (n. 38)
70  Li (n. 63)
71  European Commission, ‘Report of the 5th Round of Negotiation for a Free Trade 
Agreement between EU and Indonesia’ < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/
july/tradoc_157137.pdf> accessed 8 March 2019.
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enhanced transparency, and third-party access.
This proposal began to be realised, incorporated within the texts of 
economic partnership agreement and investment protection agreement 
with EU’s trading partners, a couple of them are Singapore and Viet Nam. 
These agreements serve as the working prototype of ICS in reality, with 
EU’s final aim is to establish a multilateral investment court to replace 
current arbitrators-ruled ISDS mechanism. In this paper, I have explained 
that the inter-regional cooperation of ASEAN and the EU could serve 
as a stepping-stone towards realising multilateral investment court. 
The EU regards ASEAN as a strategic partner in its external economic 
policies, and two of EU IPAs with the ASEAN Member States have 
established the ICS. The next step needed is to enlarge the participation 
of ASEAN Member States in making multilateral investment court. 
EU-Viet Nam and EU-Singapore have a clause that would enable the 
creation of multilateral investment court. 
However, the challenges of such expansion coming from EU’s 
internal dynamics as well as other’s state status quo attitude of developing 
states. Belgium’s political move in asking an Opinion to ECJ delayed 
overall ratification process of CETA, causing ICS to remain non-
operational. Recent conclusion of EU-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
sans any ICS or ISDS mechanism demonstrated the inconsistency of 
EU approach in promoting its ISDS reform agenda by ICS. We could 
also point out that so-called ICS is a dormant paper tiger, the absence of 
practical experience and lesson learned would be the biggest hindrance 
towards multilateral investment court. Without the empirical proof 
on how the mechanism would work practically, other prospective 
EU’s partners, including ASEAN Member States, which comprises of 
developing the country and LDCs could be skeptical about the agenda. 
One of the main constraint of developing and LDCs are capacity and 
financial constraint in engaging in ISDS proceeding, without addressing 
this constrain, any reofrm is not really attractive. Thus, in order to chase 
further expansion of multilateral investment court, the EU must settle 
its own internal problem with ICS, and create an inclusive framework 
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